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abstract: this paper analyzes the extent to which differences in operating performance, eco-
nomic growth, efficiency and productivity between labour-owned (loFs) and participatory capi-
talist (PCFs) firms can be attributed to their distinct capital-ownership structures, which in turn 
reflects their different ways of managing capital and labour as well as interpreting primary business 
function theory. the study uses a variety of quantitative techniques, including panel data analysis, 
data envelopment analysis, stochastic frontiers and the like to conclude that many of the relation-
ships posited by economic theory fail to correspond with the successful performance of loFs. there 
are no substantial differences in growth potential, operating performance or productive efficiency 
between the two types of firms. another result of interest is that the traditional indicators used to 
measure firm performance in loFs and also used by financial service companies in business risk 
analysis are not completely appropriate and may be threatening firm survival.
Key words: capital-ownership structure, managerial efficiency, managerial performance, data 
envelopment analysis, stochastic regression frontier analysis, panel data analysis. 
introduction*
the overall aim of this paper is to analyze the extent to which differences 
in operating performance, economic growth, efficiency and productivity be-
tween labour-owned (loFs) and participatory capitalist (PCFs) firms can be 
attributed to their distinct capital-ownership structures. the core issue is 
the capital ownership structure of each type of firm in its dual role as a key 
determinant of the primary objective function of each type of firm and as a 
major impact player in the development of its corresponding capital and la-
bour policies. our interest therefore focuses on testing the main hypothesis 
empresas cUyo capital es de los trabajadores y empresas  
capitalistas participatiVas: diFerentes enFoQUes a sUs 
desaFíos Financieros y operatiVos. 
resUmen: este trabajo analiza hasta qué punto las diferencias, en el ren-
dimiento operativo, el crecimiento económico, la eficiencia y la productiv-
idad entre las empresas cuyo capital es de los trabajadores (labour-owned 
Firms - loFs) y las empresas capitalistas participativas (participatory capi-
talist firms - PCFs), se pueden atribuir a sus estructuras distintas de capital 
y de propiedad, que a la vez reflejan las diferentes maneras de manejar el 
capital y a sus trabadores, además de la interpretación de la teoría de la 
función primaria del negocio. el estudio utiliza una variedad de técnicas 
cuantitativas, que incluyen el análisis de datos de panel, el análisis por 
envoltura de datos, los modelos fronterizos estocásticos y similares para 
concluir que muchas de las relaciones planteadas por la teoría económica 
no corresponden con el rendimiento exitoso de las loFs. no existen dife-
rencias importantes entre los dos tipos de empresas en cuanto al potencial 
de crecimiento, el rendimiento operativo o la eficiencia productiva. otro 
resultado de interés, es que los indicadores productivos que se utilizan 
para medir el rendimiento de las empresas en las loFs, y que también son 
usados por las compañías de servicios financieros en el análisis de riesgo 
del negocio, no son completamente adecuados y pueden constituir una 
amenaza para la sobrevivencia de las empresas.
palabras claVes: estructura de propiedad del capital, eficiencia ger-
encial, rendimiento gerencial, análisis por envoltura de datos, análisis de 
modelos fronterizos estocásticos, análisis de datos de panel. 
entreprise appartenant aUX traVailleUrs et entreprises de 
participation capitaliste : approcHes diFFÉrentes de leUrs 
dÉFis Financier et de rendement.
rÉsUmÉ: Cet article analyse dans quelle mesure les différences de perfor-
mance d’exploitation, de croissance économique, d’efficacité et de produc-
tivité entre entreprises appartenant aux travailleurs (loF) et entreprises 
de participation capitaliste (PCF) peuvent être attribués à leurs structures 
de propriété du capital distinctes, ce qui reflète à la fois leurs différentes 
manières de gestion du capital et du travail ainsi que leur interprétation 
de la théorie de la fonction principale de l’entreprise. L’étude utilise une 
variété de techniques quantitatives, y compris l’analyse de panel de don-
nées, l’analyse par l’enveloppement de données, frontières stochastiques 
et autres afin de conclure que la plupart des relations postulées par la 
théorie économique ne parviennent pas à expliquer les bonnes perfor-
mances des LOF. Il n’y a pas de différences substantielles dans le potentiel 
de croissance, le rendement d’exploitation ou l’efficacité productive entre 
les deux types d’entreprises. Un autre résultat intéressant est que les indi-
cateurs traditionnels utilisés pour mesurer la performance des entreprises 
LOF et également utilisé par les sociétés financières d’analyse des risques 
d’entreprise ne sont pas complètement appropriés et peuvent même men-
acer la survie des entreprises.
mots clÉs : structure de la propriété du capital, efficacité du manage-
ment, performance du management, analyse par l’enveloppement des don-
nées, analyse de la frontière stochastique de régression, analyse de panel 
de données.  
cooperatiVas (loF) e sociedades comerciais (pcF): diFerentes 
propostas a respeito dos seUs desaFios Financeiros e 
operatiVos
resUmo:  este artigo analisa até onde as diferenças no desempenho op-
erativo, no crescimento econômico, na eficiência e na produtividade, que 
existem entre as loF e as PCF, podem ser atribuídas às diferentes estru-
turas de propriedade de capital, que assim mesmo refletem as diferentes 
formas como são manejados o capital e o trabalho assim como a inter-
pretação da teoria da função principal das empresas. o estudo abrange 
uma variedade de técnicas quantitativas que incluem a análise de dados 
de painel, análise envolvente de dados, fronteiras estocásticas e similares 
para concluir que muitas das relações indicadas pela teoria econômica 
não estão em consonância com o desempenho exitoso das loF. não ex-
istem diferenças substanciai no crescimento em potência, no desempenho 
operativo e tampouco na eficiência produtiva entre os dois tipos de em-
presas. outro resultado interessante é aquele dos indicadores tradicionais 
usados para medir o desempenho nas loF e que as companhias de serviços 
financeiros também usam a fim de realizar análises de riscos empresariais, 
os quais não são completamente apropriados e podem estar ameaçando a 
supervivência das empresas. 
palaVras cHaVe: estrutura de propriedade do capital, eficiência ger-
encial, desempenho gerencial, análise envolvente de dados, análise de re-
gressão de fronteiras estocásticas, análise de dados de painel.  
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of the traditional economic theory that performance dif-
ferences between loFs and PCFs are mainly due to their 
distinct objective functions and corresponding different 
ways of managing labour and capital (e.g. dow, 2001, mel-
garejo, et al. 2007a, 2007b).
the empirical evidence presented in this study is drawn 
from a set of panel data on loFs and PCFs in the autono-
mous Community of navarra, spain. the geographical se-
lection reflects the increasing importance of loFs in spain, 
as a result of law 4 of march 24, 1997, which was devised 
to encourage their development and particularly in navarre 
as in incubator of new loFs, through its own fiscal mea-
sures (e.g. melgarejo, 2008). Financial data for loFs were 
gathered from the navarra trade Register, while financial 
data for the PCFs were drawn from the saBi database. 
the analysis covers the period 1994-2003. after removing 
firms with incomplete data or outliers with values more 
than three standard deviations from the mean (Hair, et al. 
2006), we were left with 248 loFs and 1,308 PCFs. the 
firms analysed are relatively homogeneous, in that all are 
small or very small firms (eC, 2003), operating in the same 
economic sectors, i.e. industry and services, as defined in 
the Eurostat’s NACE VI.1 classification system of economic 
activity. as a result, all of these firms are subject to sim-
ilar business growth and risk pressures and devoid of the 
expected fluctuations in growth due to variations in eco-
nomic conditions and business culture across autonomous 
communities. 
Before proceeding any further, some definitions are in 
order to establish a correspondence between the terms 
used in the economic literature and their legal interpreta-
tion under spanish law. First, the terms “capital ownership 
structure” and “capital factor” should not be considered 
synonymous. the former refers to whether the firm is a loF 
or a PCF, while the latter is one of the characteristics that 
differentiate a loF from a PCF. second, in terms of char-
acterization of the firms, spanish loFs operate under their 
own legal framework established by the aforementioned 
law 4 of march 24, 1997. according to this legislation, the 
main characteristic of loFs is that at least 50% of the cap-
ital must be owned by the workers on full-time open-ended 
contracts with the firm. their holding shares, defined by 
the above-mentioned law as “labour class shares”, are a 
direct function of their contribution to capital and labour. 
this definition concurs with that of Jansson (1986). alter-
natively, PCFs correspond to traditional stock-traded firms, 
where the owners’ control of the firm is proportional to 
their respective share of capital owned. Ben-ner and Jones 
(1995) describe in greater detail the nature of different 
business-ownership structures.
the remainder of the paper is organised as follows: sec-
tion ii contains a brief review of the main contributions to 
the literature in the socio-economic context, with a view 
to explaining behavioural differences between loFs and 
PCFs deriving from their objective function, the labour 
factor and the capital factor. Hypotheses regarding the 
impact of this capital-ownership dichotomy on the oper-
ating performance, efficiency and productivity of the two 
types of firms under analysis are described and the results 
presented in sections iii, iv and v, respectively. section vi 
contains a preliminary analysis of the joint effect of busi-
ness growth, productive efficiency and firm size. some con-
cluding comments and suggestions for further research in 
section vii complete the paper.
review of the literature
this section is devoted to the key issue being debated in 
the economic literature: the impact of the capital-owner-
ship structure of a firm on its objective function, labour 
factor and capital factor. We start with the objective func-
tion that was the main focus (dow, 2001) of the early re-
search (e.g. domar, 1966; ireland, 1987; ireland and law, 
1982; meade, 1972; vanek, 1970; Ward, 1958; Bruque, 
et al., 2002) on economic differences between loFs 
and PCFs. According to the economics literature, firms’ 
table 1. number of firms in the data base
number of enterprises before 1994 1994-1997 after 1997 total
loF
industrial 29 27 41 97
services - Ctt 18 21 55 94
others 9 9 39 57
total loFs 56 57 135 248
pcF
industrial 357 63 121 541
services - Ctt 331 89 207 627
others 60 19 61 140
total PCFs 748 171 389 1.308
total 804 228 524 1.556
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objective functions vary according to two main factors. 
First, even though the common objective function of all 
firms, regardless of size (Jarvis, et al. 2000), is profit maxi-
misation, small firms focus primarily on survival and sta-
bility. second, the objective function also differs according 
to the capital ownership structure. the most widely-held 
view in the early research on the subject was that LOFs’ 
objective function is the maximisation of net income per 
worker, while that of PCFs is the maximisation of total 
profits. 
nevertheless, it is the different role played by the labour 
factor in loFs and PCFs that gives rise to the main behav-
ioural performance difference between these two types of 
firms (monzón, 1989). these differences are primarily re-
lated to the size of the labour force, and to output and 
owner/worker remuneration policies (Melgarejo, et al. 
2007c). in terms of size, the number of workers remains vir-
tually unchanged in the short-term, and is thus much less 
sensitive to changes in market conditions than is the case 
for a PCF (Robinson, 1967). as far as output is concerned, 
the variability in the production level of a loF reflects 
fluctuations in demand or cost (dow, 2001). With respect 
to owner/worker remuneration, economic theory suggests 
that, without the assumption of perfect elasticity in the 
labour market, efficiency problems arise when the amount 
of labour used by loFs deviates from the optimum level 
(Bartlett, et al. 1992).
Finally, in relation to the capital factor, the literature shows 
that one of the main problems faced by loFs stems from 
the lack of their own resources for financing operations. 
this, in turn, increases their reliance on outside financing, 
something loFs attempt to avoid, for fear of losing con-
trol of their businesses. a potentially harmful outcome of 
this occurrence is the increasing dependence on outside 
short-term funding, giving rise to diminishing negotiating 
powers with outside institutions and serious problems with 
external capital costs, bank guarantees, etc (Jarvis, et al. 
2000; Park, et al. 2004). thus, social economy firms in 
general, and loFs in particular, become more sensitive to 
the economic cycle and liable to incur higher financial ex-
penses, which have a negative impact on their profit-gen-
erating capacity. this may lead firms into a degenerative 
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process impeding their financial recovery and ultimately 
increasing their risk of financial and business failure (me-
dina, et al. 2000).
differences arising from the objective function, and from 
the labour and capital factors, obviously have certain im-
plications for LOFs’ operating efficiency and competitive-
ness (morales, et al. 2003) that distinguish them from PCFs 
(Chaves and monzón, 2008). the following sections study 
the nature of these differences.
 modelling the impact of a firm’s ownership 
structure on its operating performance
Bearing in mind that the economic literature reports dif-
ferences in firms’ objective function according to their 
capital ownership structure, this section will be devoted to 
testing whether these differences have an impact on the 
operating performance of LOF’s and PCFs. The model used 
is portrayed graphically in the upper half of Figure 1 and 
the description of all variables used, in table 2. Following 
Carton and Hofer (2006), the variables used to measure 
operating performance include indicators for financial per-
formance, profitability, financial structure, wage remunera-
tion and solvency. of these, only the lesser-known ZRISK 
and λRISK, the indices of perceived risk and of solvency 
margin, respectively, deserve further consideration. they 
can be defined as follows:
[ ]{ }
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  (1)
where E(ROA) and σ(ROA) are the mean and the standard 
deviation, respectively of the firm’s ROA; CAP represents 
the ratio of equity capital to total assets; and zα measures 
the standard normal variate at α. ZRISK (Hannan and 
Hanweck, 1998) proxies for the interaction of the income-
generating capacity, the potential magnitude of return 
shocks and the level of capital reserves available to absorb 
sudden shocks. alternately, the solvency margin, λRISK 
(García-marco and Robles-Fernández, 2008), represents 
the limit of a one-sided confidence interval at the α-level 
of statistical significance, obtained under the assumption 
that the firm’s ROA is normally distributed.
table 2: definition of the dependent and independent 
variables
dependent variables 
economic performance
va value added = Profits before interest and taxes plus 
amortization and labour costs
VAA Value Added/Total Assets
VAS Value Added/Total Sales
EBITDA earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization
EBITDAA EBITDA/Total Assets
EBITDAS EBITDA/Total Sales
profitability
Roa Return on Assets = (Profits before interest and taxes)/Total 
assets=iaRoi+ioindeB
Roi Return on investment = (Profits before interest expenses 
and taxes plus interest income)/Total Equity
ROS Return on Sales =(Profits before interest and taxes)/Total 
sales
Financial structure
io Average Cost of Debt = Interest expenses/ Total Liabilities
INDEB Indebtedness = Total Liabilities /Total Assets
Worker Remuneration
ROL = personnel expenditures/profits before taxes
ROLF = personnel expenditures/(profits before interest and taxes)
short-term solvency
LR  Liquidity Ratio = Short-term Assets/Short-term Liabilities 
long-term solvency
TS  Total solvency=Total Assets/Total Liabilities
ZRISK  index of perceived risk, defined in (1) 
λRISK  index of solvency margin, defined in (1)
independent variables
Capital-ownership configuration: Co
LOF =1, if labour-managed firm; 0, otherwise
Life-cycle/Gibrat growth: LG
Age  = number of years in operation 
environmental variables: eV
IND =1, the firm belongs to the industrial sector; 0, otherwise
CTT =1, if the firm belongs to Commerce, transportation or 
tourism; 0, otherwise
otHeRs  =1, if the firm belongs to information technologies, 
Communications or services to enterprises; 0, otherwise
vyeaR  =1, if yeaR=1995,…,2003; 0, otherwise
l97  =v98+v99+v00+v01+v02+v03=1, if the firm was formed 
after 1997; 0, otherwise
strategic risk factors: sr
R1t  =1, if the firm belongs to the ith quartile of a given 
dependent variable, i=1,2,3,4; 0, otherwise
a direct effect from loFit on the various measures of op-
erating performance, illustrated on the left-side of Figure 
1. the second is an indirect impact, hypothesized to be 
dependent upon (i) the size of the firms, through Gibrat’s 
proportionate growth model (Gibrat, 1931); (ii) their age, 
ittititi
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Figure 1 depicts the impact of the capital-ownership struc-
ture, modelled in two different ways. the first represents 
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FigUre 1. modelling the impact of the firm’s ownership structure on its operating performance
in all cases, the test favoured the fixed-effects model, with 
a p-value under 0.01. therefore, only the results obtained 
from the fixed effects model are shown in table 3. 
the results found for the evaluation of firm performance 
gains in loFs and PCFs have important implications and 
conceptual considerations. First, the fixed-effects models 
of table 3 show a substantial degree of explanatory power, 
judging by the very high adjusted-R2 values. this evi-
dence clearly attests to the appropriateness of using these 
models to explain the variation in various measures of man-
agerial performance. second, the evidence does not sup-
port the traditional theory regarding the issue. in fact, in 
terms of growth, loFs perform no worse than PCFs and 
smaller firms grow faster that big ones, independently of 
their capital-ownership structure. third, in the absence of 
market values, it is necessary to include other risk mea-
sures, such as strategic risk and other dynamic risk mea-
sures (ZRisK and λRisK). loFs tend to position themselves 
more often in the extreme risk categories, whereas PCFs 
are more prominent in the middle quartiles. But there is 
mixed evidence at best to demonstrate that a firm’s long-
term survival potential is tied to its capital-ownership 
structure. Fourth, the impact of the environmental factors 
varies according to the particular variable. For example, the 
1997 law produces a strong and positive impact for loFs 
on most of the performance measures. However, neither 
the age of the firm nor the economic sector in which it op-
erates are impacted by its capital ownership configuration, 
even though younger firms tend to exhibit higher levels of 
operating performance than their older counterparts. 
capital ownership 
structure
(loFit)
indirect effectdirect effect
age
(evans, 1987)
size
(Gibrat, 1931)
Risk
(Collins and 
Rueffli, 1996)
environmental
variables
(Petrunia, 2008)
Performance measures
(Carton and Hofer, 
2006)
using the life-cycle model proposed by evans (1987a, b); 
the strategic risk component of Collins and Rueffli (1996); 
and (iv) a set of environmental variables (e.g. Petrunia, 
2008) that include the economic sector to which the firm 
belongs, the year of operation, and the 1997 law on loFs. 
Further details on the rationale for the use, estimation and 
definition of these variables, as well as a compilation of 
the existing literature on the various hypotheses, appear 
in melgarejo (2008). 
the equation that describes the above model appears in 
the bottom half of Figure 1, where the concepts of direct 
and indirect effect are defined. the first term represents 
the direct effect, independent of the elements included in 
table 2 and, as depicted in Figure 1, is a function of the 
specific firm’s capital-ownership configuration. Its value 
is β0, if PCF (LOFi=0) or β0+Δβ0, if loF (LOFi=1). the rela-
tive magnitude of Δβ0 reveals which effect is the strongest; 
testing the null hypothesis that Δβ0=0 determines whether 
loFs and PCFs show signs of any differential impact upon 
the corresponding measure of operating performance. the 
indirect effects are tested in a similar way, in relation to 
all the equation variables, with the null hypotheses Δβi=0, 
i=1,…,20, determining whether the capital-ownership con-
figuration of the firms in question causes each explicator to 
exhibit a differential impact on each performance measure.
the estimation procedure centres on the panel data model, 
widely used for this type of cress-sectional/time-series data 
structure (Green, 2008). Fixed effects and random effects 
estimation procedures were applied on each of the depen-
dent variables, and Hausman’s test (Green, 2008) was used 
to decide which of the two models was more appropriate. 
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table 3. regression results – Fixed effects model
coef.
independent 
Variables
economic performance profitability
VA VAA VAS EBITDA EBITDAA EBITDAS ROA ROI ROS
β0 β 0 5,29 *** 0,09 *** -0,52 *** 5,35 *** -1,09 *** -1,26 *** -1,16 *** -0,19 *** -1,09 ***
β1 ln v i t-1 -0,02 *** 0,25 *** 0,29 *** 0,07 *** -0,08 *** 0,05 ***
β2 ln age it -0,31 *** -0,11 *** 0,11 *** -0,22 *** -0,05 ** -0,07 **
β3 (ln v i t-1)^2 0,04 *** 0,01 *** 0,01 *** 0,02 *** -0,01 *** 0,00 *** -0,02 ***
β4 (ln age it)^2 0,05 *** 0,03 *** -0,01 ** 0,01 ** 0,01 * 0,02 ***
β5 ln v i t-1*ln age it 0,01 ** 0,04 *** 0,04 *** 0,04 *** 0,01 **
β6 indi 0,13 *** 0,09 ***
β7 othersi 0,14 *** 0,09 *** 0,10 *** -0,22 ** 0,07 * 0,09 * -0,16 ***
β8 ind i*ln age it -0,05 *** -0,04 ***
β9 others i *ln age it -0,05 *** -0,03 ** -0,02 ** 0,09 ** -0,03 * 0,07 *** -0,05 ** 0,06 **
β10 l97 0,11 *** -0,03 *** 0,28 *** -0,06 *** -0,06 *** -0,13 *** -0,15 ***
β11 R 1t -1,29 *** -1,11 *** -1,16 *** -2,98 *** -1,74 *** -2,26 *** -2,59 *** -2,60 *** -3,11 ***
β12 R 2t -0,71 *** -0,65 *** -0,63 *** -1,45 *** -0,99 *** -1,32 *** -1,57 *** -1,38 *** -1,96 ***
β13 R 3t -0,41 *** -0,39 *** -0,32 *** -0,82 *** -0,58 *** -0,78 *** -0,97 *** -0,71 *** -1,28 ***
β14 v96 0,04 *** 0,22 *** 0,08 *** 0,09 *** -0,10 *** 0,07 ***
β15 v97 0,08 *** 0,21 *** 0,04 * 0,06 *** -0,08 ***
β16 v99 0,03 *** 0,04 *** 0,04 ** -0,07 *** 0,07 ***
β17 v00 0,07 *** -0,04 *** 0,10 *** 0,04 *** 0,03 * 0,09 *** 0,05 **
β18 v01 0,06 *** -0,04 *** 0,04 *** -0,10 *** 0,04 ** -0,09 *** 0,09 ***
β19 v02 0,08 *** -0,04 *** 0,05 *** -0,24 *** 0,04 ** -0,06 ***
β20 v03 0,07 *** -0,05 *** 0,02 ** -0,26 *** -0,07 *** -0,03 ** -0,10 *** -0,18 *** 0,09 ***
Δβ0 loFi -0,71 *** 0,24 ***
Δβ 1 loFi *ln v i t-1 0,09 *** 0,06 * 0,23 *** -0,07 * 0,12 ***
Δβ 2 loFi*ln age it -0,46 *** -0,21 *** 0,13 * 0,16 *
Δβ 3 loFi *(ln v i t-1)^2 0,01 *** 0,04 *** 0,08 *** -0,02 *** 0,01 * 0,01 ** 0,02 ***
Δβ 4 loFi *(ln age it)^2 0,18 *** 0,06 *** 0,19 ***
Δβ 5 loFi *ln v i t-1ln age it -0,03 ** -0,05 ** 0,05 ***
Δβ 6 loFi*indi 0,16 ***
Δβ 7 loFi*othersi -0,23 *** 0,16 *** 0,29 ***
Δβ 8 loFi*ln age it * ind i -0,09 *** -0,05 *
Δβ 9
loFi*ln age it * 
others i -0,08 ** -0,12 **
Δβ 10 loFi*l97 -0,07 *
Δβ 11 loFi*R 1t 0,44 *** -0,14 *** -0,23 *** -0,10 *** -0,17 ***
Δβ 12 loFi*R 2t 0,37 *** -0,06 ** -0,13 *** -0,05 ** -0,06 *
Δβ 13 loFi*R 3t 0,23 *** -0,08 *** -0,05 * -0,09 ***
Δβ 14 loFi*v96 -0,09 ** -0,07 *
Δβ 15 loFi*v97
Δβ 16 loFi*v99 0,11 ** -0,11 *
Δβ 17 loFi*v00
Δβ 18 loFi*v01 -0,08 ** -0,21 **
Δβ 19 loFi*v02 -0,07 * -0,29 *** 0,07 *
Δβ 20 loFi*v03 -0,07 * -0,23 **
adjusted r2 0,92 0,86 0,90 0,76 0,83 0,83 0,84 0,82 0,84
Hausman test (p-value) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
nº observations 10047 9974 10006 9834 9963 10038 9998 9926 10025
*, **, ***, significant at 10.5 and 1%, respectively.
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table 3. regression results – Fixed effects model (continuation)
coef.
independent 
Variables
Financial structure worker remuneration solvency
io INDEB ROL ROLF LR TS ZRISK λRISK
β0 β0 -2,24 *** -0,04 *** 2,97 *** 2,50 *** 0,74 *** 0,71 *** -2,12 *** -0,64 ***
β 1 ln v i t-1 -0,23 *** 0,16 *** 0,09 *** 0,07 *** 0,14 *** 0,16 *** 0,17 *** 0,16 ***
β2 ln age it 0,36 0,16 ***
β3 (ln vi t-1)^2 -0,05 *** -0,04 *** -0,01 *** -0,02 *** -0,01 *** 0,04 *** 0,01 *** -0,21 ***
β4 (ln age it)^2 0,03 *** 0,01 *** -0,01 ***
β5 ln v i t-1*ln age it 0,03 *** 0,08 *** 0,07 *** 0,08 *** 0,03 *** 0,10 ***
β6 indi -0,03 *
β7 othersi 0,23 *** 0,21 ***
β8 ind i*ln age it 0,01 *
β9 others i *ln age it -0,12 *** -0,06 ***
β10 l97 -0,32 *** -0,02 *** 0,08 *** 0,02 ***
β11 R 1t -2,22 *** -0,67 *** -3,95 *** -3,17 *** -0,96 *** -0,67 *** -4,72 ***
β12 R 2t -1,07 *** -0,32 *** -2,41 *** -1,89 *** -0,63 *** -0,51 *** -2,96 *** -0,02 ***
β13 R 3t -0,59 *** -0,16 *** -1,45 *** -1,15 *** -0,43 *** -0,34 *** -1,74 ***
β14 v96 0,06 *** -0,02 *** 0,03 *** 0,02 ***
β15 v97 -0,07 *** -0,02 ** 0,31 *** 0,09 *** 0,02 **
β16 v99 -0,16 *** -0,02 *** 0,19 *** -0,10 *** 0,02 ** 0,02 *** 0,36 ***
β17 v00 -0,28 *** -0,01 ** 0,09 *** 0,04 * 0,01 0,32 ***
β18 v01 -0,22 *** -0,02 *** 0,22 *** -0,23 *** 0,02 *** 0,27 ***
β19 v02 -0,18 *** -0,03 *** 0,07 *** 0,02 ** 0,03 *** 0,26 ***
β20 v03 -0,30 *** -0,03 *** -0,08 *** 0,04 *** 0,03 *** 0,29 ***
Δβ0 loFi 0,46 ** 0,12 ** 0,20 ***
Δβ 1 loFi *ln v i t-1 0,35 *** 0,17 *** -0,07 ** -0,06 ** 0,06 0,21 ***
Δβ 2 loFi*ln age it 0,11 *
Δβ 3 loFi *(ln v i t-1)^2 0,05 *** 0,09 *** 0,01 ** 0,02 *** 0,01 *** -0,09 *** 0,01 ** -0,05 ***
Δβ 4 loFi *(ln age it)^2
Δβ 5 loFi *ln v i t-1ln age it 0,03 ** -0,04 *** -0,05 *** -0,04 *** -0,08 **
Δβ 6 loFi*indi 0,10 ** -0,18 *
Δβ 7 loFi*othersi 0,24 * -0,82 ***
Δβ 8 loFi*ln age it * ind i -0,06 *** 0,09 **
Δβ 9 loFi*ln age it *others i -0,14 * 0,42 ***
Δβ 10 loFi*l97
Δβ 11 loFi*R 1t -0,26 *** -0,15 *** -0,32 *** -0,39 *** -0,38 *** -0,26 ***
Δβ 12 loFi*R 2t -0,03 ** -0,22 *** -0,21 *** -0,23 *** -0,21 ***
Δβ 13 loFi*R 3t -0,17 *** -0,20 *** -0,19 *** -0,17 ***
Δβ 14 loFi*v96
Δβ 15 loFi*v97
Δβ 16 loFi*v99 0,33 ***
Δβ 17 loFi*v00 0,34 ***
Δβ 18 loFi*v01 -0,10 * 0,41 *** -0,17 **
Δβ 19 loFi*v02 -0,10 * 0,41 *** -0,06 **
Δβ 20 loFi*v03 0,38 ***
adjusted r2 0,86 0,90 0,86 0,83 0,84 0,90 0,84 0,93
Hausman test (p-value) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
nº observations 9773 9951 9850 9869 9896 9953 5763 5740
*, **, ***, significant at 10.5 and 1%, respectively.
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the impact of the firm’s ownership 
structure on operating efficiency
To further explore capital/labour factor differences be-
tween loFs and PCFs, we assess the extent to which tech-
nical efficiency variations between loFs and PCFs are due 
to differences in capital ownership structure. to differen-
tiate the two terms, observe the following definitions. an 
economic unit “is said to be fully efficient, if and only if 
it is not possible to improve any input or output without 
worsening some other input or output.” [Cooper, et. al., 
2000: 45]. in other words, technical efficiency measures 
the ability of each firm to transform the minimum possible 
number of units of its own resources into the maximum 
possible levels of outputs. our review of the literature re-
veals very few empirical studies comparing the efficiency 
of loFs and PCFs, even though the importance of technical 
efficiency on the growth of firms is well established (e.g. 
Callejón and segarra, 1999; arauzo and segarra, 2005). 
the main papers include sexton and iskow (1993), the 
meta-analysis made by doucouliagos (1997), salazar and 
Galve (2007) and the recent paper by maletta and sena 
(2008), all of which find scant differences between the 
two types of firms. the literature attributes the lack of re-
search on the efficiency of loFs to their small size (taymaz, 
2005; Fritsch, et al. 2006; taymaz and Köksal, 2006) and 
to differences in their capital ownership structure (dow, 
2003; Park et al. 2004).
the methodological basis for this analysis consists of the 
three-stage DEA-SFA (Data Envelopment Analysis / Sto-
chastic Frontier analysis) model of Fried, et al. (2002). 
With this approach, it is possible to separate three 
sources of variation in firm performance: statistical noise, 
environmental factors and pure inefficiency. Figure 2 sum-
marizes this three-step decomposition approach. in the 
first stage, technical efficiency scores are calculated ap-
plying the dea method using input minimization with vari-
able returns to scale. outputs and inputs for this stage 
were selected based on related research (e.g. ahuja and 
majumdar, 1998). the only output is value added, defined 
as profits before interest and taxes, plus amortization and 
labour costs. there are three inputs: Fixed assets (Fa) as 
a proxy for capital; labour, measured as the number of 
employees in each firm; and the solvency margin, λRisK 
of (1), as a proxy for each firm’s risk exposure. The second 
stage consists of a stochastic frontier analysis, in which 
the first-stage efficiency indicators, used as dependent 
variables, are decomposed in three parts. one relates to 
the set of uncontrollable inputs otherwise denoted as en-
vironmental variables, used here as the independent vari-
ables. the latter include Age, LOF, IND, defined in table 
2 and SIZE, which takes a value of 1 if the firm in ques-
tion is a micro firm and 0 otherwise. another component, 
the vis in Figure 2, represents the statistical noise and the 
third, the uis, corresponds to the pure managerial efficien-
cies of interest in this section. Finally, in the third stage, 
dea is rerun using the output from stage 1 and inputs ad-
justed for environmental effects and statistical noise of the 
second stage. this process yields a set of pure efficiency 
measures, devoid of the pernicious effects of statistical 
noise and environmental factors.
Figure 3 graphically depicts the efficiency comparisons be-
tween stage 1 and stage 3, from 1997 to 2003, while 
table 4 numerically justifies the use of stage 2. From these 
and the more comprehensive numerical results in mel-
garejo, et al. (2008), our analysis of the empirical evidence 
FigUre 2. the three–stage dea–sFa model
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standard variable-returns-to-scale 
dea formulation
First stage
Uses sFa approach to regress the 
total, radial and non-radial input 
slack independently on a set of 
environmental variables
second stage
Re-runs dea on the outputs of the 
first stage and on the adjusted 
inputs purged of both exogenous 
environmental effects and statistical 
noise from the second stage
third stage
0
1
..
,
=T
k
k
e
xX
yYts
Min
 
nnn
nnn
nn
T
nn
Xxswhere
uv
zs
IiandNnFor
=
=
+=
== ,...,1,...,1
ˆ ˆ[max{ } ]
ˆ ˆ[max{ } ], 1,...,
A
n n n n n n
n n
x x z z
v v n N
= + +
=
j o u r n a l
r e v i s t a
innovar
13rev.  innovar vol.  23,  núm. 48,  abril-junio de 2013
may be summarized as follows. First, the evidence clearly 
indicates that the decomposition has led to statistically 
higher efficiency scores in the final stage. the increase in 
efficiency provides indirect validation of the three-stage 
decomposition model, as it unmistakably shows the sub-
stantial degree of underestimation in efficiency that oc-
curs if the impact of the environmental variables and of 
uncertainty has not been taken out. separating the firms 
according to capital-ownership structure does not lead to 
statistically significant differences in underestimation.  
second, the data in table 4 suggest that the second-stage 
appears to have successfully decomposed the efficiency 
estimates into the desired three parts. the p-values indi-
cate that the estimated coefficients of the environmental 
variables are statistically significantly different than zero, 
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for practically any significance level. the only exceptions 
are ind and siZe for the Slack-λ-RISK variable. also the 
statistical significance of lambda and sigma for all slack 
variables suggests that a high proportion of the variability 
can be attributed to technical inefficiency, which helps to 
justify stage 3 results.
third, the stage 3 evidence in Figure 3 reveals that the ef-
ficiency scores exhibit very low values and wide dispersion, 
especially among PCFs, even when the trend reverses in 
2003. Fourth, these increases are relatively smaller at the 
lower end of the efficiency scale than at the higher eche-
lons, with a corresponding impact on the skew of efficiency 
distribution. Fifth, even if the average loF is more efficient 
than its average PCF counterpart, in both the industrial 
and service sectors and overall, the hypothesis that the av-
erage firm, be it loF or PCF, is equally efficient cannot be 
rejected. sixth, from data not presented here (melgarejo, 
2008), there are very few firms of either type on the effi-
ciency frontier. nevertheless, there are more efficient PCFs, 
especially in the last three years. in fact, no loF from the 
service sector appears on the frontier. 
an important implication of this evidence is that the pre-
ponderance of low efficiency levels, together with the pres-
ence of very few firms on the frontier, has negative effects 
on the long-term survival chances of this type of firm. it is 
in line with the high bankruptcy rates normally exhibited 
by loFs, as well as the serious competitive problems af-
fecting even the surviving enterprises, due to their small 
size. it also highlights the need for public policies that 
would reinforce their efficiency level. Furthermore, the type 
of correctives needed calls for strengthening investment 
policies on fixed assets and reinforcing capitalization pro-
grams aimed at improving the financial structure of loFs 
and particularly their debt portfolio (e.g. sexton and iskow, 
1993; maleta and sena, 2008). the main objective of such 
programs is to lower the high opportunity costs incurred 
by loFs, as a result of their excessive levels of risk aver-
sion and their corresponding extreme reluctance to acquire 
external financing, for fear of losing control of their orga-
nizations. assuaging these fears is likely to lead towards 
the implementation of financial regulation polices aimed 
at encouraging banks to handle riskier loans. 
the impact of the firm’s ownership 
structure on productivity
This section assesses the impact of the firm’s capital-
ownership structure on its productivity by means of the 
malmquist Productivity index (mPi), a performance in-
dicator used to measure total factor productivity (tFP) 
changes over the 1994-2003 time period under study in 
this paper. Based upon the definition of efficiency in the 
previous section, we can now characterize Productivity as 
the rate at which an economy transforms its inputs into 
outputs, regardless of the efficiency of that transformation.
The MPI’s computational unit of interest is the distance 
function, developed by shephard (1970) as an alternate 
descriptor of production technology. its popularity stems 
from interest in the estimation of technical efficiencies 
for cases where price information is not available or the 
standard microeconomic assumptions related to cost and 
revenue functions do not hold (e.g. Coelli et. al., 2005). 
the starting point for developing the expression for the 
mPi is a production technology characterised, for each 
period t =1,2,...,t, by (i) an input vector, XtεRN, and an 
output vector, YtεRN; (ii) the set of all feasible inputs and 
outputs, as defined by the graph, GRt, of the production 
technology, which in turn defines Pt(xt), the production 
possibility set, which is closed, bounded, convex and sat-
isfies the assumption of strong disposability of inputs 
and outputs and where
T ...  ,2  ,1  =  t  ,}GR    )y ,x( : y{ = )x( P
 }y produce can x : )y ,x{( = GR
tttttt
ttttt
    (2)
and (iii) an output-oriented distance function, which repre-
sents the technology defined in (2) as follows:
table 4. stage 2 stochastic Frontier regression results
Variable
slack-λ risK slack-Fixed assets slack-employment
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
Constant 0.56 0.00 953.06 0.00 25.42 0.00
age 0.01 0.00 17.98 0.00 0.28 0.00
loF 0.07 0.00 100.04 0.00 -2.63 0.01
ind 0.00 0.86 80.27 0.00 8.57 0.00
size 0.02 0.23 -599.32 0.00 -6.72 0.00
            lambda 3.67 0.00 2.59 0.00 4.45 0.00
            sigma (u) 0.37 0.00 651.09 0.00 20.29 0.00
           log-likelihood function 1650.28 -17556.45 -7883.74
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where a subscript of r=c denotes computations of the 
output distance function under constant returns to scale 
(CRs), whereas r=v implies that no scale restriction has 
been imposed and hence a variable returns to scale (vRs) 
technology is feasible. the first right-hand side (RHs) of 
(3) depicts Shephard’s (1970) output distance function, 
as being representative of the technology defined in 
(2). The second RHS of (3) links this function to Farrell’s 
(1957) index of technical efficiency and thus to its estima-
tion through dea methodology (e.g. Coelli, et al., 2005). 
drt(xt,yt)=1 if yt is located at the frontier or outer isoquant 
border of Pt(xt). the dea formulation is also straightfor-
ward (e.g. Coelli, et al., 2005):
23
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once the procedure for computing the distance functions 
has been established, the methodology of this paper calls 
for computation of the Generalized malmquist Produc-
tivity index (GmPi) of Grifell-tatjé and lovell (2000). the 
GmPi uses drt(xt,yt) as the basic unit of measurement (i) 
for estimating the productivity change between year t and 
t+1, under any returns-to-scale technology, be it vRs (r=v) 
or CRs (r=c); and (ii) for its decomposition into three fac-
tors: technical efficiency change (teF), technical change 
(tCHt) and a scale effect (Res). the first factor, teF, mea-
sures the extent to which the firm in question is able to 
move up, i.e. catch up, to the level of its more productive 
rivals, thereby reflecting how far away it is from the effi-
ciency frontier. teF ranges in value from <1, 0, >1, signal-
ling the extent to which a period of decline, stagnation or 
growth, respectively, from year t to year t+1, can be attrib-
uted to decreases, no change, or increases, respectively, in 
technical efficiency. the second factor, tCH, measures to 
what extent the firm’s innovative capabilities are able to 
contribute to changes in productivity over time. thus, its 
value reveals the extent to which a period of decline, stag-
nation or growth, respectively, from year t to year t+1, can 
be attributed to technical progress, be it negative (tCH<1), 
no change (tCH=0), or positive (tCH>1). the third, Res, 
measures the effect on productivity of the economies of 
scale exhibited by the firm in question, through a com-
parison of productivity changes from a given year to the 
next under CRs and under vRs. the product of tCH and 
teF gives the mPi, which has been shown (e.g. Coelli, et 
al., 2005) not to accurately reflect productivity change 
under non-constant returns to scale. the GmPi solves this 
problem through computation of the scale effect, Res. the 
expressions for the GmPi and for its various components 
are given next (e.g. Coelli, et al., 2005):
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a graphic representation of the productivity changes 
throughout the 1994-2003 period under study appears 
in Figure 4. it contains one graph with the GmPi and its 
three components, for each of the years from 1998 to 
2003 and four others, with each of the five productivity 
indices, GmPi, mPi, teF, tCH and Res. according to the 
first graph, the GmPi fluctuations indicate an overall de-
crease (GmPi<1), from 1999 to 2001, in the average an-
nual productivity growth rate of all firms, regardless of 
their capital-ownership configuration, followed by a slight 
expansionary period (GmPi>1) from 2001 to 2003. such 
changes clearly follow the same pattern as the average 
firm’s scale efficiency (RES). Furthermore, observe that the 
substantial rises in GmPi due to the improvement in in-
novative capabilities (tCH) that has occurred since 1999 
have almost been cancelled out by corresponding de-
creases in the catching up efforts (teF) of the average 
firm and by the scant effort made by most of the firms, 
after 1999, to move towards the efficiency frontier (teF). 
In fact, the LOF/PCF comparison in the average TEF rates 
indicates a step backward in that goal for both types of 
firms, especially after 2000. Consistent with the evidence 
from section iv, the regression is slightly less pronounced 
for PCFs, which helps explain the higher (lower) number of 
efficient PCFs (loFs) and the lower (higher) rate of very in-
efficient PCFs (loFs).
the joint effect:  
Firm growth/size vs. efficiency
the current study has so far analyzed whether differences 
in the capital ownership configuration have a separate and 
differential effect on the growth (hence on the size) and on 
the efficiency/productivity of LOFs and PCFs. In this sec-
tion we examine whether a joint effect is also present. the 
rationale for such an endeavour is simple. even if the lit-
erature does not normally focus on growth as a primary 
business objective, it does so as a way to achieve other 
goals, by internally promoting higher returns regarding 
production factors, increasing efficiency or responding to 
a competitive environment that requires firms of all sizes to 
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FigUre 4. comparative evaluation of the generalized malmquist index and its decomposition
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expand in order to sustain future competitiveness (Canals, 
2000). the likely or expected outcome of these efforts is 
to ensure the firm’s organizational survival over time, by 
avoiding unforeseen circumstances and risks (Bueno, et al. 
1991). moreover, profit and growth are, if possible, even 
more closely interrelated for small firms, because most of 
the profit will remain in the firm in the form of self funding. 
it is in this case, as noted by Penrose (1995), that profit and 
growth may be treated as equivalent goals. Furthermore, 
some authors (e.g. Whetten, 1987) also assume efficiency 
to be the equivalent of firm growth, namely a means for 
increasing their size.
j o u r n a l
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We have carried out preliminary statistical tests of the 
existence of this size-growth-productivity relationship, 
by taking Spearman’s coefficient of correlation between 
the rankings obtained by value added, a financial perfor-
mance indicator, used in the growth and productive effi-
ciency analysis in sections iii and iv, respectively. table 5 
lists the correlation coefficients between the two sets of 
rankings of firms grouped by capital ownership structure, 
sector and size. the results from the spearman correlation 
coefficients show that there is no relationship between 
variables, insofar as the correlation coefficients for the pe-
riod 1998 to 2003 are very low, suggesting the existence 
of only weak dependence, if any, between the variables. 
logically, the p-values for the null hypothesis of zero cor-
relation are above 0.05, thus rejecting the hypothesis of 
mutual dependence. some exceptions are found for PCFs, 
but with a very low correlation coefficient. in view of the 
above, we are led to conclude that, in loFs and PCFs alike, 
firm growth is not directly related to efficiency levels or 
firm size. in short, this reasoning should lead to the formu-
lation of more solidly grounded working hypotheses for use 
in confirmatory research to test the relationship between 
firms’ ownership structure, size, growth and efficiency. 
some concluding comments and 
avenues for further research
the main conclusion of this study consists in rejecting 
many of the relationships posited by economic theory with 
respect to the impact of capital-ownership configuration 
on operative performance, on growth and on efficiency/
productivity, as these hypotheses do not correspond to the 
successful performance of loFs in navarra. in fact, loFs 
can be said to be in a more favourable competitive position 
than PCFs and are an obvious option as a legal structure 
for collective entrepreneurs in a social economy context. 
the evidence on productivity suggests an expansionary 
period at the end of the time period under consideration, 
due primarily to the increasing innovative capabilities of 
the firm, but hampered by the substantial difficulties both 
loFs and PCFs experience in reaching the efficiency fron-
tier, even though the scale factor shows signs of becoming 
a positive influence on productivity. 
our research indicates several avenues for further research 
that may lead to testable propositions in support of our 
main finding. the first avenue lies in improving the selec-
tion of performance indicators more in tune with the spe-
cific firm characteristics that accompany the two types of 
capital ownership, thereby placing greater emphasis on 
long-term considerations. these indicators should take 
into account that differences in capital ownership struc-
ture bring about changes in capital and labour remu-
neration systems, which, in turn, have an impact on the 
performance reports generated by loFs versus those for 
PCFs and on the selection of financial indicators of firm 
performance. thus, the empirical evidence leads us to be-
lieve that the traditional indicators used to measure firm 
performance in loFs and also used by financial service 
companies in business risk analysis are not completely ac-
curate and may be threatening firm survival. that same 
evidence also leads us to conclude that the more appro-
priate indicators of firm performance in loFs include Roa, 
eBitdaa, lR, ZRisK and lRisK.
a second possibility for further research is the attempt to 
disentangle the impact of size from that of organizational 
structure. the evidence indicates that small size is an ob-
stacle to growth and competitiveness, regardless of the 
table 5. efficiency vs. growth (spearman correlation)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
loF -0.09 -0.17 -0.13 -0.15 0.08 -0.04
PCF 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.13*
loF ind -0.01 -0.19 -0.35 -0.19 0.17 -0.17
PCF ind -0.02 0.11 -0.03 0.08 0.07 0.06*
loF seRv -0.36 -0.03 0.09 -0.11 -0.21 -0.08
PCF seRv 0.13 0.12 0.13 -0.04 0.07 0.19*
loF micro -0.04 -0.14 -0.08 -0.20 0.12 -0.02
PCF micro 0.06 0.12* 0.14* -0.03 0.08 0.08
loF micro ind 0.06 -0.11 -0.28 -0.28 0.20 -0.16
PCF micro ind -0.12 0.19* 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.00
loF micro seRv -0.28 -0.09 0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.11
PCF micro seRv 0.22* 0.12 0.19* -0.09 0.11 0.12
PCF small ind 0.19 0.03 -0.22 0.20 0.23 0.16
PCF small seRv 0.03 0.24 0.16 0.30 0.00 0.56*
* significant at 5%
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type of capital ownership structure. However, despite the 
lack of evidence of capital ownership structure playing a 
major role in growth and efficiency performance, it is nev-
ertheless true that loFs and PCFs need to improve their 
growth and efficiency levels. our preliminary attempt to 
look into this size/organizational structure dichotomy has 
been primarily hampered by the difficulty of finding a suf-
ficiently large sample of medium and large loFs. in the 
case of navarre, this is an impossible task, since we have 
found only two medium-size loFs and none of larger size. 
another interesting research opportunity, closely related 
to the previous one, is the possibility for deeper analysis 
of the high variability of firm performance levels that char-
acterizes the small and micro firms of this study with the 
aim of determining the extent to which such variability re-
flects only uncertainty and not risk, and the role played in 
this characterization by differences in the capital owner-
ship configuration. 
Further research prospects centre on explaining why differ-
ences in the capital ownership structure of loFs and PCFs 
do not play a very significant role in their performance ef-
ficiency. nuñez-nickel and moyano-Fuentes (2004) attri-
bute such results to the cooperative nature of loFs serving 
as a competitive buffer against business practices of firms 
with alternate organizational structures. Furthermore, the 
trend towards low efficiency levels, few efficient firms and 
high disparity in efficiency appears to be the norm for firms 
of this size (e.g. Roca and sala, 2005). this leads us back 
to the issue of exploring the extent to which small size or 
different capital-ownership structures are responsible for 
this state of affairs. in addition, a testable explanation as 
to why there are fewer loFs than PCFs on the efficiency 
frontier may stem from the fact that LOFs’ policies towards 
fluctuations in value added are reflected in changes in 
personnel expenses, rather than through changes in the 
labour force, whereas PCFs behave in exactly the oppo-
site manner. as a result, a substantial majority of any loF 
labour force is composed of worker-owners, who cannot 
legally be fired. thus, modifications in the labour force com-
position of loFs occur only through adjusting the number 
of non-owners, a relatively insignificant adjustment, which 
does not normally suffice to explain the more substantial 
changes in output. on the contrary, PCFs can and do fire 
workers, in response to decreases in va and thus use their 
resources somewhat more efficiently than loFs. in fact, 
this line of thought hints at the possibility that their ob-
jective function may lead loFs further away from the ef-
ficiency frontier, thereby further hampering their growth 
prospects. nevertheless, their small size still causes both 
types of firms to be quite inefficient, which again raises 
the prospects of small size vs. organizational structure as 
explicators of such behaviour. the study of these and other 
issues justifies additional research.
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